August 2024

_ The August edition│2024 of our Newsletter has the following highlights:

– Directors of a listed company and operators of a securities brokerage were punished with disqualification and fines for involvement in insider trading.

– Request for calling an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting by minority shareholders, election of the board of directors by the multiple vote procedure, and the Petrobras case

_ Directors of a listed company and operators of a securities brokerage were punished with disqualification and fines for involvement in insider trading

 

The Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) investigated the delivery of relevant information, which had not yet been disclosed to the market, by a director of a listed company to operators of a brokerage, as well as the use of this confidential information by such operators.

 

In a brief context, the operators of the brokerage conducted trades in the secondary market on their own behalf while in possession of non-public information about the company, which was transmitted through phone calls by a director of the company and only became public through the disclosure of a material fact by the company 10 (ten) days after the first trade was conducted.

 

The director was accused of violating his confidentiality duty as an administrator of a listed company, according to art. 155, § 1º, of Law No. 6.404/76, in conjunction with art. 8º of the former CVM Instruction No. 358/02 (revoked by CVM Resolution No. 44/2021). The operators were accused of using insider information to gain an advantage, violating art. 155, § 4º, of the same law, in combination with art. 13, § 1º of CVM Instruction No. 358/02.

 

CVM’s board unanimously decided to impose a temporary disqualification penalty on the director for 60 months, preventing him from holding administrative positions or serving as a statutory auditor in listed companies or entities that require CVM authorization. The operators were fined R$ 200,000.00 each by a majority vote. The penalties considered the director’s recidivism, previous decisions in similar cases, and the severity of the violations committed.

 

To access the full report and the vote of President João Pedro Nascimento, the voting manifestation of Director Marina Copola, and the voting manifestation of Director João Accioly in Portuguese, access the respective links.

 

_ Request for calling an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting by minority shareholders, election of the board of directors by the multiple vote procedure, and the Petrobras case

 

Request for calling a Shareholders’ Meeting by minority shareholders

Article 123 of Law No. 6.404/76 (“Brazilian Corporate Law“) establishes that the board of directors, if one exists, or the directors must call a shareholders’ meeting, observing the provisions of each company’s by-laws. In the sole paragraph, item “c,” it states that the shareholders’ meeting can also be called by shareholders representing at least 5% of the capital stock when the managers do not respond, within 8 days, to a justified request indicating the matters to be discussed.

 

For listed companies, CVM Resolution No. 70/2022 (“RCVM 70“) reduces this percentage, allowing it to be as low as 1%, depending on the company’s capital stock.

 

Despite the requirement to send justifications along with the request to call the shareholders’ meeting, it is generally understood that it is not the role of the management to evaluate the merits of such justifications; they should only verify whether the formal requirements of the request are met. The deliberation on the presented matters and justifications are up to the shareholders, gathered in a meeting, considering the applicable quorum requirements.

 

Election of the board of directors of listed companies by the multiple vote procedure

The election of the board of directors is typically conducted through slate voting, where each vote is given to a specific group of candidates for certain roles. The slate with the highest number of votes is elected, which means that a controlling shareholder can often elect all the members of the board of directors. To counterbalance this, Brazilian legislation allows for the multiple vote procedure and separate voting to ensure that minority shareholders have the opportunity to elect board members.

 

Article 141 of the Brazilian Corporate Law grants minority shareholders representing at least 10% of the voting capital the right to request the adoption of the multiple vote procedure during the elections for the company’s board of directors. Under RCVM 70, this percentage can be reduced to a maximum of 5% depending on the company’s capital stock.

Through the multiple vote procedure, the number of votes corresponding to each share is multiplied by the number of positions to be filled. Each shareholder can either accumulate their votes on one candidate or distribute them among multiple candidates, aiming to maximize the number of board members elected.

 

It is important to note that if the election is held through this procedure, the dismissal of a board member will also lead to the dismissal of the remaining members, necessitating a new election; and, in other cases of vacancies, if there is no alternate, the next shareholders’ meeting shall conduct a new election for the entire board.

 

The Petrobras Case

Having provided this background on the process for minority shareholders to call shareholders’ meetings and the election of board members through the multiple vote procedure, we will briefly address the Petrobras case, which has gained significant media attention recently.

 

One controversy involves Petrobras’s decision to elect a new board member through a meeting of its board of directors to fill a vacancy caused by a resignation request. The current Petrobras board was elected at the Ordinary Shareholders’ Meeting through the multiple vote procedure.

 

On May 15, the company announced that the current CEO’s nomination for the roles of CEO and board member would be submitted to the board itself, referring to the Brazilian Corporate Law and its by-laws while stating that the CEO would remain on the board until the first shareholders’ meeting scheduled for 2025. In a statement on May 31, Petrobras responded to a minority shareholders’ request to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting to elect a new board, arguing that there was no need for such a call and that it would entail unnecessary costs.

 

After Petrobras denied the request to call the meeting, CVM initiated administrative proceedings to investigate potential noncompliance with Article 123 of the Brazilian Corporate Law. The Associação de Investidores no Mercado de Capitais (AMEC) , an association of investors, publicly advocated for calling the meeting, arguing that it  was aligned with the election of the board through the multiple vote procedure and requested clarifications from Petrobras.

 

According to news reports, CVM’s Superintendency of Relations with Companies (Superintendência de Relações com Empresas – SEP) stated that the company’s disagreement with minority shareholders’ justifications could not preclude the calling of a meeting, emphasizing that the request only needs to meet legal requirements.

 

As of now, CVM’s board has not yet commented on the matter.

 

To access the Letter with AMEC’s request for clarification in the Petrobras case in Portuguese, access the following link: https://amecbrasil.org.br/petrobras-pedido-de-esclarecimentos-da-amec-e-decisao-da-cvm-pela-realizacao-de-age/

For more information in Portuguese on how multiple voting and separate voting procedures work in the election of the board of directors in listed companies, access our team’s article published in Legislação & Mercado through the following link: https://legislacaoemercados.capitalaberto.com.br/como-funcionam-o-voto-multiplo-e-a-votacao-em-separado-na-eleicao-do-conselho-de-administracao-em-companhias-abertas/

Encarregado de dados pessoais ganha regulamentação

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July 2024

_The July 2024 edition of our Newsletter has the following highlights:

– CVM disqualifies and imposes fines on individuals accused of insider trading and violation of confidentiality duty of manager

– CVM decision on non-disclosure of relevant fact regarding bankruptcy

– Amendment of the Brazilian Civil Code

_ CVM disqualifies and imposes fines on individuals accused of insider trading and violation of confidentiality duty of manager

 

On July 2, 2024, the Board of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (“CVM”) judged Administrative Sanctioning Process No. 19957.001830/2021-16 against a former manager and former financial advisors of a listed company for (i) the alleged use of insider information in transactions involving shares issued by the Company, in violation of Article 155, §4, of Law No. 6.404/76 (“Brazilian Corporate Law”), together with Article 13, §1, of CVM Instruction No. 358/2002 in force at the time of the facts (current CVM Resolution No. 44/2021), and (ii) the alleged transmission of relevant information not yet disclosed, in violation of the duty of confidentiality set forth in Article 155, § 1, of the Brazilian Corporate Law, together with Article 8 of CVM Instruction No. 358/2002.

In a brief context of the case, the Superintendence of Relations with Companies (“SEP”) presented its accusation alleging that a former board member together with former financial advisors of the company purchased shares using undisclosed relevant information related to the company’s project to migrate to the Novo Mercado segment of B3 S.A. – Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão.

The former board member proposed a Commitment Agreement, in which he offered to pay CVM the amount of R$42,597.00. The former financial advisors presented a joint proposal in which they also proposed the payment of the total amount of R$42,597.00. In return, the Commitment Agreement Committee suggested enhancing the proposals made, increasing the payment by those responsible to a total of R$1,647,250.00.

After several rounds of rejection of the terms presented by the Commitment Agreement Committee, the accused accepted the proposal put forward by the Committee; however, it was determined that acceptance at that time would no longer be appropriate and convenient.

Due to these conditions, the CVM’s Board ultimately decided:

  • Unanimously, to condemn the board member of the Company at the time of the facts to a temporary disqualification for a period of 60 months from holding positions as manager or member of the fiscal committee (Conselho Fiscal) of listed companies, of an entity in the distribution system, or of other entities that depend on authorization or registration before CVM, for violation of Article 155, § 1, of the Brazilian Corporate Law, in conjunction with Article 8 of CVM Instruction 358/2002 and, in the view of Director João Accioly, solely for violation of Article 155, § 1, of Law 6.404.
  • By majority, to condemn the former financial advisors to a fine of R$200,000.00, each, for violation of Article 155, § 4, of the Brazilian Corporate Law, in conjunction with Article 13, § 1, of CVM Instruction 358/2002.

The report and vote of the Reporting Director, as well as the voting statements of the other Directors, can be accessed in Portuguese through the following links:

https://www.gov.br/cvm/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/anexos/2024/20240701-pas-cvm-19957-001830-2021-26-presidente-cvm-joao-pedro-nascimento-relatorio.pdf

https://www.gov.br/cvm/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/anexos/2024/20240702-pas-cvm-19957-001830-2021-16-presidente-cvm-joao-pedro-nascimento-voto.pdf

https://www.gov.br/cvm/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/anexos/2024/20240702-pas-cvm-19957-001830-2021-16-diretora-marina-copola-manifestacao-voto.pdf

https://www.gov.br/cvm/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/anexos/2024/20240702-pas-cvm-19957-001830-2021-16-diretor-joao-accioly-manifestacao-voto.pdf

 

_ CVM decision on non-disclosure of relevant fact regarding bankruptcy

 

On June 13, 2024, CVM’s Board judged Administrative Sanctioning Process No. 19957.015040/2022-07, which sought to ascertain the potential responsibility of the then CEO of a listed company for violating Article 157, §4, of the Brazilian Corporate Law and Article 3, §1 of the then applicable CVM Instruction No. 358/2002, due to the failure to disclose a relevant fact regarding a court ruling that extended the effects of another company’s bankruptcy to the aforementioned listed company.

The process originated from CVM Administrative Process No. 19957.009129/2021-45, also initiated by the SEP, which aimed to analyse the conduct of the managers of the company concerning the absence of disclosure of a relevant fact related to the bankruptcy declared by the Court.

In summary, after being notified by CVM regarding the court ruling, the company published a market announcement stating that it had not previously disclosed the declaration of bankruptcy as the court decision lacked legal grounds, as it had not yet become final, and asserting that it would make every effort to reverse the decision. One year later, the company published a relevant fact informing of the dismissal, without merit ruling, of Rescission Action No. 2285273-94.2021.8.26.0000 (“Rescission Action”), which aimed to annul the final decision resulting from the bankruptcy process.

In light of this scenario, CVM sent a letter to the manager and controlling shareholder of the company at the time of the events, requesting that he respond concerning the facts and the compliance with the duty to inform as provided in Article 157 of the Brazilian Corporate Law. In response, the then-manager and shareholder stated that he was aware of the facts but had not disclosed them under the guidance of the company’s legal advisors, who perceived a strong possibility of reforming the decision.

Considering these facts, SEP concluded that the then-manager and controlling shareholder was aware of the bankruptcy declaration of the company, and there was no doubt regarding the relevance and materiality of the information about the extension of the bankruptcy effects to the company. Furthermore, according to SEP’s understanding, the omission of the then CEO of the company could not be justified based on advice from the company’s legal advisors under the premise of a brief reform of the ruling.

After analysing the case and following the vote of Reporting Director Otto Lobo, CVM’s Board unanimously decided to impose a fine of R$460,000.00 on the manager for the charges presented.

More information about the process can be accessed in Portuguese through the following links:

https://www.gov.br/cvm/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2024/cvm-multa-diretor-presidente-da-industrias-j-b-duarte-s-a-em-r-460-mil-por-nao-divulgar-fato-relevante

https://www.gov.br/cvm/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/anexos/2024/20240612-pas-cvm-19957-015040-2022-07-relatorio-diretor-otto-lobo.pdf

https://www.gov.br/cvm/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/anexos/2024/20240613-pas-cvm-19957-015040-2022-07-diretor-relator-otto-lobo-voto.pdf

 

– Amendment of the Brazilian Civil Code

 

On July 1, 2024, Law No. 14.905 was enacted, which establishes the monetary correction index for non-compliance with financial obligations, determines the rate of default interest, and excludes the application of Decree-Law No. 22,626/1933 (also known as the Usury Law” in certain legal relationships. The provisions (added or modified) will come into effect 60 days after the publication of the law, that is, on August 31st, 2024.

In practical terms, in contracts or other instruments that regulate any legal relationship that do not contain the monetary correction index agreed upon by the involved parties or that is not defined in a specific law, the new law alters Article 389 of the Civil Code to adopt the Broad Consumer Price Index (Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo – IPCA). Moreover, the new wording of Article 406 of the Civil Code establishes that the remuneration interest in loan contracts for economic purposes (Article 591) and the default interest, in the absence of contractual agreement or specific legal provision, will be equivalent to the SELIC rate, with the deduction of the IPCA.

Finally, Article 3 of the new law specifies that the Usury Law does not apply to the following operations:

  • between legal entities;
  • represented by credit instruments or securities;
  • contracted with:
    1. financial institutions and other institutions authorized by the Central Bank of Brazil;
    2. investment funds or clubs;
    3. leasing companies and simple credit companies;
    4. public interest civil society organizations that grant credit as provided in Law No. 9,790/1999;
  • conducted in the financial, capital, or securities markets.

To access the content of Law No. 14.905, dated June 25, 2024, in Portuguese please visit:

https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2023-2026/2024/lei/L14905.htm

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